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1.  Introduction 
1.1   A fundamental problem with many utilities is that they 
are dependent on networks which are natural monopolies: 
there is no natural market which can set a market price. 
The difficulty, therefore, is how prices should be set, so that 
the natural monopoly is not being exploited to overcharge 
customers, while at the same time companies earn a 
reasonable return on their operating activities, and on the 
capital invested. The solution to this problem very often 
involves oversight by a regulatory body in setting revenue 
or price caps for the utility. Many of the techniques 
currently used by regulatory bodies in setting revenue or 
price caps involve an assessment of the total value of the 
capital assets employed by the utility: this is variously 
known as the Regulatory Capital Value, (RCV), Regulatory 
Asset Value, (RAV), or Regulatory Asset Base, (RAB): (in 
this paper, we will use the term RCV throughout.) Under a 
typical RCV based approach, prices are set so as to allow 
for the operating expenses of the utility, as well as an 
allowance for the depreciation of capital assets, and a 
return on the total value of the assets employed: other 
factors, like possible efficiency savings, are also commonly 
brought in. 
 
1.2   There are many different approaches which can be 
employed towards the problem of estimating RCV. One 
basic decision, for example, is whether capital assets 
should be valued at historic or current prices. In this paper, 
we are concerned with versions of the RCV method which 
involve estimating the total value of the capital assets of 
the utility in some form of current prices: we denote such a 
version of the RCV approach as being a “current cost RCV 
approach”. 
 
A version of such current cost RCV pricing is, for example, 
used by the water regulator, OFWAT, in setting prices for 
the water industry in England and Wales: this version was 
developed in the mid 1990’s: its antecedents can be found 
in a mid 1980’s Treasury report, known as the Byatt report, 
on the problems of nationalised industry accounting in an 
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era of high inflation. A similar version of current cost RCV 
pricing is now also applied to the water industry in 
Scotland, and to other utilities in the UK. Versions of 
current cost RCV pricing are also applied in several other 
countries. 
 
1.3   This paper demonstrates that there are two 
fundamental errors in the current cost version of the RCV 
approach: (this is illustrated with reference to the version of 
current cost RCV pricing currently applied in the water 
industry in the UK). First, when utility prices are set to cover 
current cost depreciation, and to earn a market interest rate 
of return on the current cost capital value of the industry, 
(as happens under current cost RCV pricing), then the very 
act of investing in capital assets yields a large cash surplus 
to the utility. Investment itself thus becomes a highly 
profitable activity- largely irrespective of whether or not the 
investment yields an adequate physical return: and the 
longer the asset life of the investment, the larger the cash 
surplus. This has major effects on utility behaviour, 
resulting in distortion of capital programmes, excessive 
dividend returns to equity holders, overcharging, and 
distortion of the gearing ratios of the companies. 
The second fundamental flaw relates to mistaken handling 
of the concept of opportunity cost when a utility is a price 
maker. The concept of the opportunity cost of capital 
provides an important part of the rationale for the current 
cost RCV approach: and yet for a price maker, (like a 
typical utility), the burden of costs rests on the consumer, 
so opportunity cost decisions should be made at the level 
of the consumer, not at the level of the company running 
the utility. The RCV method therefore needs to be 
supplemented with appropriate reward and decision 
making mechanisms for consumers, so that they can 
exercise the required opportunity cost functions. 
 
1.4   The structure of this paper is as follows: 
 
Section 2 introduces the RCV method of utility pricing, and 
gives some brief history. 
 
Section 3 shows how the current cost RCV method as 
applied in the UK builds on the fundamental principles of 
current cost accounting developed in the Byatt report. 
 
Section 4 shows how, on the basis of a simple financial 
model of a utility operating in a form of steady state, the 
application of current cost RCV pricing in the presence of 
even low levels of inflation results in the generation of a 
large cash surplus within the utility, over and above the 
cash required to satisfy the net present value criterion for 
investment. 
 
Section 5 describes the resulting distortions in utility 
behaviour. 
 
Section 6 answers the resulting paradox: how could the 
application of the reasonable sounding principles inherent 
in the current cost RCV approach lead to such perverse 
consequences. The answer is that there are basic fallacies 
in the current cost RCV approach. These relate in 
particular to a failure to identify the real cost savings 
resulting from the interaction of inflation with long asset 
lives: linked to this there is a failure to adequately 
distinguish the different sources, (debt, equity, retained 
profits, and inflation), from which the capital value of a 
company is funded: and there is the failure to address the 
fact that standard arguments of opportunity costs do not 
apply to price makers. 
 
Section 7 sets out our conclusions and recommendations. 
In particular, there is now an urgent requirement: 
 
• to revisit some of the principles of current cost 
accounting set out in the Byatt report; 
 
• to devise an acceptable alternative to the current cost 
RCV approach to utility price setting. 
 
1.5   In the specific Scottish context, recent months have 
seen the start of what promises to be a lively debate about 
whether the water industry in Scotland should remain in 
public ownership. Various politicians, city firms, and the 
Scottish CBI have made statements in favour of either 
mutualising or privatising Scottish Water. Even the 
Treasury, according to media reports, supports such a 
move. Controversially, the Regulator, Sir Ian Byatt, was 
quoted as saying that water should be freed from State 
ownership. Our findings in this paper have profound 
implications for this debate. Given the substantial 
overcharging implicit in the current cost RCV approach to 
pricing, the overriding priority should be to correct this, and 
introduce a more soundly based system for charging for 
water in Scotland. Such a change, however, would have 
the effect of making investment in a privatised Scottish 
Water a much less attractive proposition. In effect, once the 
cushion implicit in RCV overcharging is removed, it 
appears doubtful whether there would be significant public 
expenditure  savings to be made by moving Scottish Water 
into a privatised or mutualised status: (and indeed, given 
the higher cost of debt which a privatised or mutualised 
Scottish Water must incur, there might even be a net public 
expenditure cost involved in privatisation or mutualisation, 
because of the need to provide an initial dowry from the 
public sector in the form of substantial debt commutation). 
It is not the intention of this paper to go into these matters 
in detail. What is absolutely clear, however, is that no 
meaningful discussion can take place on long term options 
for change in the status of Scottish Water, until the 
fundamental problems identified in this paper have been 
rectified. 
 
2.  RCV approaches to price setting: outline and 
history 
2.1 As noted above, in principle, the RCV of a utility is an 
estimate of the total value of the capital assets employed 
by the utility in performing its functions: it is the RCV which 
is the capital base used in setting charge limits. A typical 
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RCV approach to price or revenue setting for the utility 
involves the regulator setting the maximum allowable 
prices, (or revenues), of the utility to cover: 
 
• operating expenses, (perhaps discounted for whatever 
level of efficiency savings the regulator judges is 
achievable); 
 
• an allowance for depreciation, (that is, the amount of 
capital assets used up during the relevant period); 
 
 
• an allowance for an appropriate return on the capital 
assets employed by the utility, (typically calculated as 
the product of an assumed rate of return multiplied by 
the RCV). 
 
For further details, see, for example, World Bank (2004). 
 
2.2 Within this general description of the RCV approach, 
a number of different options are possible, as regards the 
basis of calculation of RCV, and as regards the 
measurement of depreciation. For example, in estimating 
RCV, assets could be valued on some historic cost basis, 
or on some version of current cost, like replacement value, 
equivalent asset value, or disposal value: (see Kearney 
and Hutson, (2001), for more detailed discussion). The 
choice of the appropriate depreciation measure to use will 
normally be more or less determined by the method 
chosen to estimate RCV- but again, a variety of options, in 
either historic or current cost terms, is possible. 
For the purposes of this present paper, we are concerned 
with versions of the RCV method which value the assets of 
the utility at current prices. 
 
2.3   In a typical application of the current cost RCV 
approach to utility price setting by a regulator, (see for 
example Water Industry Commissioner for Scotland, 2005), 
the RCV is rolled on from year to year by : 
 
a.   uprating for inflation; 
 
b.   adding in the value of gross investment; 
 
c.   deducting depreciation, as assessed in current cost 
terms; 
 
The regulator then sets revenue caps for the industry, (that 
is, maximum allowable revenues, which therefore 
determine maximum allowable prices), as the sum of: 
 
i. the level of current operating expenses the regulator is 
prepared to allow; 
 
ii.   current cost depreciation; 
 
iii.  a capital charge, calculated as the product of an 
assumed rate of return times the estimated RCV. 
The assumed rate of return at (iii) will typically be set at the 
weighted average interest rate facing the utility in question 
weighted over the different sources of finance accessed by 
the company: (but see paragraph 4.11 below). 
2.4   A current cost version of the RCV method of utility 
pricing was initiated in the mid 1990s in England and 
Wales by the water regulator OFWAT, (see, for example, 
OFWAT 2004), to set the revenue caps for the water and 
sewerage companies, which had been privatised in 1989. 
The approach has subsequently been extended in the UK 
to the regulation of the electricity distribution network, 
airports, and the publicly owned water industry in Scotland, 
and will in future be used for the water industry in Northern 
Ireland. Technical papers published by the World Bank 
advocate the use of current cost depreciation in RCV 
models, (see for example World Bank, 1999 and 2004): 
and versions of current cost RCV pricing are used in 
certain utilities in countries like Australia, Germany, and 
Laos: (see references Australia, (1992), Germany (2005) 
and Laos, (2004)). Note that some other countries, such as 
Estonia and South Africa, use an RCV approach based on 
historic cost: (see references Estonia, (2003) and South 
Africa, (2002)). 
 
3.   How the RCV approach relates to the fundamental 
principles of the Byatt report 
3.1   The current cost RCV approach as used in UK 
utilities, with its use of current cost depreciation, and of 
asset values estimated at current prices, is an example of 
the application of current cost accounting to the problems 
of utility regulation and price setting. Its primary intellectual 
antecedent was the report “Accounting for Economic Costs 
and Changing Prices”, produced for HM Treasury in 1986 
by an advisory committee chaired by Ian Byatt 
(H.M.Treasury, (1986)): this report is commonly referred to 
as the Byatt report. Sir Ian Byatt went on to become the 
first regulator of the water industry in England and Wales, 
and in that role was responsible for the introduction of the 
current cost RCV method for price setting in the water 
industry. 
 
3.2   In this section, we identify four of the key principles in 
the Byatt report which are reflected in the current cost RCV 
method. Note, however, that the Byatt report itself does not 
set out the principles of the current cost RCV approach. 
For one thing, the Byatt report was primarily concerned 
with problems of presenting meaningful accounts in an era 
of high inflation - rather than with the problems of how 
prices should be set: in addition, the Byatt report was 
concerned with nationalised (that is state owned) 
industries, while the current cost RCV approach has mainly 
been applied to the problem of  price setting in privately 
owned utilities. It is important to bear this in mind, 
particularly since, as we will argue later, some of the 
problems which we shall identify are due to inherent 
difficulties in the Byatt report itself: while others are due to 
inadequate care having been taken in translating from the 
public sector context, with which the Byatt report itself was 
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concerned, to the very different context of the private 
sector. 
 
3.3   The four key principles of the Byatt report which are 
encapsulated in the current cost RCV method are as 
follows: 
 
a.  Capital maintenance 
The Byatt report argued that accounts should give a clear 
picture as to whether or not the capital of the business was 
being maintained. In fact, two concepts of capital 
maintenance were distinguished: maintaining the physical 
operating capital of the business, and maintaining the 
financial capital. This distinction is brought out in the 
following quotation: 
 
“Both operating capability and financial capital 
maintenance have their place, depending on the purpose 
of the accounts. Management of a continuing business will 
emphasise the need to avoid distributing funds required to 
maintain operating capability. Investors will want to 
calculate the real rate of return after the maintenance of the 
real value of their capital for comparison with returns 
available elsewhere.” 
Source: Byatt Report, vol. 1, para, 87 
 
It can be seen from the description of the current cost RCV 
approach in the preceding section, how this principle has 
carried over into the current cost RCV method: if prices are 
set using the current cost RCV approach, then, since 
prices will incorporate an element representing current cost 
depreciation, sufficient financial provision has been set 
aside to maintain physical operating capacity. Moreover, 
since prices also include an element representing the 
assumed rate of return applied to RCV, then, since this rate 
of return will be close to current interest rates, a rational 
market would value the undertaking at a price at least 
equal to (RCV - Debt): hence implicit in the current cost 
RCV approach is the maintenance of financial capital. 
 
b.  Opportunity cost 
Another important principle in the Byatt report related to the 
concept of the opportunity cost of capital: the return being 
generated on capital assets should be clearly identifiable 
from the accounts, and that return should be at least 
equivalent to what could be earned in alternative uses of 
the capital - hence ensuring efficient deployment of capital 
resources. As paragraph 49 of the Byatt report states: 
 
“The cost of capital in nationalised industries has, 
therefore, been measured by the normal profit which could 
have been earned by using those resources in the 
competitive private sector, ie its opportunity cost to the 
economy as a whole.” 
Source: Byatt Report, Vol 1, para, 49. 
 
In terms of the current cost RCV method, this opportunity 
cost requirement is met by setting an appropriate rate of 
return on the RCV  based on current market interest rates. 
c.  Securing the benefits of competition 
While recognising that many utilities are de-facto 
monopolies, nevertheless the Byatt report was concerned 
that the nationalised industries at that time should behave 
as if they operated in competitive markets: and that the 
accounting, (and pricing), policies of nationalised industries 
should form no barrier to potential entrants. To secure this, 
Byatt intended that the accounts should identify economic 
costs, described as “…the costs of resources used 
(treating normal profit as a cost) at the prices which would 
be incurred by a new competitor entering the market now”: 
Source:  Byatt Report, Vol 2, para, 3.13 
 
In current cost RCV terms, the requirement that prices 
should cover current cost depreciation, and a return based 
on current market interest rates applied to the whole 
current value of the capital base of the industry means that, 
in principle, a new entrant funding capital expenditure 
through borrowing could afford the resulting depreciation 
and interest charges. In other words, the current cost RCV 
approach ensures that prices are set high enough for new 
entrants to be able, in principle, to enter the market. 
 
d.  Enabling the Industry to Attract Sufficient Funds for New 
Investment 
The final principle of the Byatt report which we highlight is 
that the accounts should demonstrate whether the return 
earned on capital is sufficient to persuade investors to lend 
to the industry any capital it might require for investment 
purposes. As paragraph 3.11 of Byatt states: 
 
“In an efficient capital market, a business which is seen to 
be earning an adequate real return on investment will be 
able to raise any extra funds required to finance the 
maintenance or expansion of its operating capability.” 
Source:  Byatt Report, Vol 2, para, 3.11 
 
In current cost RCV terms, a business maintaining its 
physical capital through charging current cost depreciation, 
and earning an appropriate rate of return on its RCV, would 
clearly satisfy the requirement of normally being able to 
attract new capital. 
 
3.4 Thus we see that key accounting principles in the Byatt 
report are reflected in the current cost RCV method of 
setting utility prices. We will show in the next section, 
however, that, in effect, the way the current cost RCV 
method has been set up over-estimates the costs of 
running a utility on a sustainable basis. 
 
4.   A simple steady state model, and what it implies 
about the operation of the current cost RCV approach 
4.1   In this section, we consider the case of a utility 
operating with a constant annual investment programme in 
real terms, (that is, measured at constant prices), and 
funding that investment by borrowing: we will contrast the 
utility’s actual cash requirement for debt repayment and 
interest with the revenues which would be generated from 
customers by the application of current cost RCV pricing. 
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4.2   Let us assume that the utility starts out with a clean 
slate, (that is, it starts with no accumulated historic debt or 
financial surplus): and in every year from year 1 on carries 
out a fixed amount of real investment: (for simplicity, and 
with no loss of generality, the annual amount of real 
investment is assumed to be 1). It is assumed that capital 
assets have a fixed life, of n years. It is assumed that the 
inflation rate each year is r, (expressed as a fraction): so 
the actual amount of investment in money terms from year 
1 on is 1, (1 + r), (1 + r) 
2 
, ... and so on. Finally, it is 
assumed that the utility finances its investment by 
borrowing at a fixed interest rate, i, (again, expressed as a 
fraction). There are therefore three parameters in the 
model, namely, n, r and i. 
 
4.3   It is a standard result, (ref: Joskow, 2005, quoting 
Schmalensee), that, if the utility charges customers each 
year an amount equal to historic cost straight line 
depreciation of the capital assets, plus interest on 
outstanding debt, then this approach will satisfy the Net 
Present Value criterion for investment. In other words, this 
approach will generate sufficient revenue to repay the 
capital which has been borrowed, and give lenders a return 
on the loans equal to the opportunity cost of their capital. 
This approach is the so-called Brandeis formula, (Joskow, 
2005), which is simply denoted here as the “historic cost” 
approach. The sum of historic cost depreciation and 
interest charges on outstanding debt therefore indicates 
how much cash a utility funding its capital investment by 
loans, actually needs to generate from charges each year 
to finance the capital side of its operations. 
 
4.4   Now consider the difference between the amount of 
revenue the utility would be generating in charges from 
customers under current cost RCV pricing, (that is, the sum 
of current cost depreciation and the RCV capital charge), 
compared with its actual cash requirement as determined 
by the historic cost approach, (that is, as we have seen, the 
sum of historic cost depreciation and historic cost interest 
payments). After the utility has been in operation n years, 
this difference will attain a steady state in real terms, given 
by the following formula: 
The quantity in formula (1) will always be positive: that is, it 
represents a surplus. The major part of the remainder of 
this paper will be concerned with exploring the implications 
of this surplus: including the implications for the utility’s 
behaviour, and the question of how the surplus arises. In 
relation to this latter point, we shall see that the current 
cost RCV method involves some fundamental 
misconceptions on the cost of running a utility in an 
inflationary environment, on what the contribution of the 
equity holder actually is towards the funding of the capital 
base of the utility, and how the different funders of the 
capital base should be reimbursed. 
 
4.5   The current cost RCV method is based on current cost 
accounting. Current cost profit and loss accounts are 
important, because these are the regulatory accounts used 
by a regulator like OFWAT, which are meant to give an 
accurate picture of how the industry is performing. But note 
that very little of the surplus given by formula (1) need 
appear as observable profit in the current cost profit and 
loss account of the utility. This is because current cost 
depreciation, and interest charges on whatever debt the 
utility has, are allowable charges against profits. Hence, an 
unknown, but possibly large, part of the surplus in formula 
(1) will be subtracted from operating surplus in calculating 
observable profit on a current cost basis, and thus will not 
appear in the figure for profit. Thus, a more appropriate 
description of the quantity in formula (1) would be 
“concealed financial surplus”, rather than “profit”. 
 
4.6   The above formula becomes informative when we 
consider specific values of the parameters n, r and i. Table 
1 illustrates the values of the formula, expressed as 
percentages, for two selected interest rates, (5% and 
7.5%), for asset lives of 10, 20, 30 and 40 years, and for a 
range of inflation assumptions. Note that the basic model 
assumes a steady state real annual investment of 1: 
therefore, the values in the table represent the concealed 
financial surplus expressed as a percentage of the level of 
investment. 
 
Thus, in this scenario, for an asset life of 30 years and an 
inflation rate of 2.5%, the current cost RCV method yields a 
financial surplus over the historic cost requirement of 
42.9% of capital investment. 
 
[1  + 
i(n + 1) 
2 
 
](1 + r) 
-1
 
[1 - (1 + r) 
-n 
] 
- - 
nr 
 
 
Here, for an asset life of 30 years and an inflation rate of 
2.5%, the financial surplus is 50.5% of capital investment.  
i[1 - 
1 
(1- (1 + r)
-n 
)]/r 
nr 
 
(1) It is immediately apparent that the financial surplus under 
the current cost RCV method grows rapidly with each of n, 
r and i, and that the surpluses are large. 
 
The derivation of the formula is given in Annex 1. This 
formula was originally given in JR Cuthbert (2006), in a 
response to a discussion paper issued by the UK 
regulators OFWAT and OFGEM, (Ofwat/Ofgem, 2006), 
relating to the observed increases in gearing in certain 
utilities in the UK. 
4.7  In the real world, of course, there is also the question 
of tax. If it is assumed that the utility has so managed its 
affairs that its debt is close to what debt would have been 
under the historic cost method, then the “historic cost” 
component of the current cost RCV revenues will not be 
subject to tax, since (in the UK), the taxman uses the 
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historic cost accounts, not the current costs accounts, in 
assessing tax. However, the financial surplus given by 
formula (1) will be subject to tax. If the utility pays 30% tax 
on this surplus, then, for example, in the n=30, i=5%, 
r=2.5% case, the utility would have a post tax surplus of 
42.9*0.7 = 30.0%. For an interest rate of 7.5%, the surplus 
would be 50.5*0.7 = 35.4%. Hence the post tax surpluses 
implied by formula (1) are still very substantial. 
 
 
Table 1a First scenario:  the surplus generated  by RCV, in 
excess of the historic cost requirement,  as a percentage of 
capital investment, for interest = 5%, and for varying 
lengths of asset life and inflation rates 
 
 
Asset life (years) 
10 20 30 40 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      
 0.5 2.6 .62 10.4 15.4 
 1.0 5.1 11.9 19.8 28.8 
 1.5 7.5 17.2 28.3 40.7 
Inflation (as 2.0 9.7 22.1 36.0 51.1 
percentage) 2.5 11.9 26.7 42.9 60.3 
 3.0 14.0 31.0 49.2 68.5 
 3.5 16.0 34.9 54.9 75.7 
 4.0 17.9 38.6 60.1 82.1 
 4.5 19.7 42.0 64.8 87.8 
 5.0 21.4 45.2 69.0 92.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b Second scenario: as above, but for interest = 
7.5% 
 
 
Asset life (years) 
10 20 30 40 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.5 
0.5 2.8 7.0 12.0 18.5 
1.0 5.5 13.5 23.3 34.8 
1.5 8.0 19.5 33.3 49.2 
4.8   What the above means is that, under the current cost 
RCV method of setting utility prices, the mere act of 
undertaking capital investment funded by fixed interest 
borrowing yields a very considerable concealed financial 
surplus for the utility, that is, over and above what is 
needed to run the business on an ongoing basis, given that 
it can borrow at the interest rate in the model. We shall 
consider some of the likely implications of this in more 
detail in the next section. But to give an idea of the 
magnitude of the effects involved, imagine that the 
hypothetical utility we are considering had originally been 
set up by an equity owner who put in a token share capital 
of a penny, and never put in any more equity finance: that 
is, to all intents and purposes, this utility is still the entirely 
debt funded entity considered in formula 1. Then the entire 
post-tax surplus of the utility could, in principle, be taken by 
the owner as a dividend, while in no way compromising the 
ability of the enterprise to keep operating. In other words, 
the token initial equity stake of a penny could generate, in 
principle, an annual dividend equal to 30% of the yearly 
level of capital investment by this utility, (in the n =30, i 
=5%, r =2.5% case): an extremely attractive return. 
Alternatively, if there was no equity owner to take out the 
surplus as a dividend, and the surplus was therefore 
retained in the utility, then in a relatively small number of 
years, the utility would first become debt free, and later, the 
owner of substantial, and growing, positive financial assets. 
 
 
4.9   It is also useful to consider another implication of the 
above model: namely, what the gearing would be, (that is, 
the ratio of debt to RCV), for a utility operating under the 
historic cost model, but charging its customers prices as 
determined under the current cost RCV method. (In 
considering what the gearing of such a company would be, 
we are assuming that the concealed cash surplus under 
the RCV method is not retained within the company: if it 
was retained, the company would rapidly become debt 
free, and the concept of gearing would become 
meaningless.) 
 
The steady state ratio of debt to RCV for such a utility is 
given by 
 
 
gearing ratio:- 
Inflation (as 
percentage) 
2.0 10.5 25.1 42.3 61.8 
2.5 12.8 30.3 50.5 73.1 
 
2[1 - 
1 
(1 - (1 + r) 
-n 
)](1 + r) 
3.0 15.1 35.1 58.0 83.0 
3.5 17.2 39.6 64.7 91.9 
4.0 19.3 43.8 70.9 99.8 
4.5 21.3 47.7 76.5 106.8 
  nr   
, (2) 
r(n + 1) 
5.0 23.1 51.4 81.6 113.1 and is a function only of r and n: see Annex 1 for derivation 
5.5 24.9 54.8 86.2 18.7 of this formula. Table 2 shows the values of this ratio, 
6.0 26.7 58.0 90.5 123.8 expressed as percentages, for a range of values of r and n. 
6.5 28.3 60.9 94.4 128.3 We see that as inflation increases and as asset life 
7.0 29.9 63.7 97.9 132.4 increases the gearing of debt to asset value falls. 
7.5 31.4 66.3 101.2 136.0  
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Table 2: Gearing, (that is, ratio of debt to RCV), for a utility 
operating under historic cost model 
 
 
 
Asset life (years) 
10 20 30 40 
this section is based on the RCV method as implemented 
in Scotland: (WIC, 2005). In one important respect, 
however, the RCV method as applied in Scotland differs 
from the version of RCV as currently applied by OFWAT to 
the water industry in England and Wales: the difference 
relates to the assumed interest rate applied in calculating 
the RCV capital charge. OFWAT have confirmed, (private 
communication), that they calculate the capital charge, in 
 
 0.0 100 100 100 100 cash terms, by applying the current real average market 
0.5 99 97 95 94 interest rate to the RCV of the company, rather than, (as is 
1.0 97 94 91 88 the case under the version of RCV applied in the water 
Inflation (as 1.5 96 91 87 83 industry in Scotland), applying an average nominal rate. 
percentage) 2.0 94 89 83 79 At first sight, it might therefore appear that formula (1), 
 2.5 93 86 80 74 which is based on the nominal rate of interest, would 
 3.0 92 84 77 71 overstate the financial surplus being generated under the 
 3.5 91 81 74 67 version of RCV as applied by OFWAT, who apply the real 
 4.0 89 79 71 64 rate of interest. However, closer examination of the interest 
 4.5 88 77 68 61 rates actually assumed by OFWAT tells a different story. 
 5.0 87 75 66 58 In their determination of charges for 2005-10, OFWAT 
 5.5 86 74 64 56 assume a real, post tax return on the non-debt component 
 6.0 85 72 62 54 of RCV of  7.7%, (see OFWAT 2004, p219), which equates 
 6.5 84 70 60 52 to an 11% real return pre-tax. They also assume a real pre- 
 7.0 83 69 58 50 tax rate of 4.3% on the debt component of RCV. OFWAT 
 7.5 82 67 56 48 weight together the debt and non-debt real interest rates on 
      the assumption that debt represents 55% of RCV. This 
leads to an average pre-tax real rate of 7.3%, which is, 
effectively, the percentage OFWAT actually apply to RCV 
4.10   The most important implication of table 2 and its 
associated theory, is what it says about the concept of 
gearing. It is implicit in much that is written about gearing 
that RCV, (that is, the value placed on the physical assets 
of the utility at current prices), is essentially financed from 
two sources, namely, debt and equity. In fact, as table 2 
shows, gearing ratios will be less than 100, even for an 
entirely debt funded utility in which there is no equity at all, 
as soon as inflation is above zero: and the higher the rate 
of inflation and the longer the asset life, the lower the 
gearing will be. A proper decomposition of RCV, (as 
estimated at current prices), into the components which 
contribute to its financing would distinguish four different 
components: namely, debt funding, equity funding, funding 
from retained profits, and the effect of inflation in enhancing 
the value of capital assets. For the debt funded utility being 
considered here, only the first and last of these 
components contribute to RCV. Failure to separate out 
these components of current cost RCV means that much 
conventional discussion of gearing ratios is likely to 
exaggerate the importance of the equity contribution to 
RCV. If the different contributory components to the 
funding of RCV are not properly distinguished, then it is 
likely to be impossible to work out a system for rationally 
apportioning the return on capital to the correct recipients: 
and the current cost RCV method, which implicitly regards 
all of the current cost RCV not funded by debt as being 
funded by equity, will grossly over-reward equity. 
 
4.11   Finally, as noted in paragraph 2.3, the description of 
the current cost RCV method underlying the modelling in 
in working out the cost of capital, (including tax). However, 
as we have seen, OFWAT’s real pre-tax rate of return on 
debt is 4.3%: this would equate to a nominal pre-tax cost of 
debt of 6.8%, which is less than the figure of 7.3% which 
OFWAT actually apply to their RCV in setting charges. 
Since formula (1) is based on the assumption of the same 
interest rate being applied to RCV to calculate the cost of 
capital as is paid on the debt of the utility, the implication is 
that formula (1), and the figures in Table 1, would actually 
understate the level of financial surplus being generated 
under the OFWAT variant of RCV. 
 
 
4.12   There is, in addition, a general moral to be drawn 
from this example - that great care has to be taken to 
distinguish exactly how the RCV method is being applied in 
any specific case. This is often by no means clear given 
the inadequate levels of detail commonly published by 
those applying the RCV approach - probably because the 
details of the calculation will typically relate to matters 
which may be regarded as being “commercial in 
confidence”. 
 
 
5. The likely effects of current cost RCV pricing on 
the behaviour of utilities 
5.1   This section discusses the likely implications of the 
above theory for the behaviour of utilities. The probable 
effect will be to materially distort a number of important 
aspects of behaviour. These were identified in the paper by 
JR Cuthbert (2006) as follows. 
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5.2   Distortion of capital programmes 
If capital investment in itself is a highly profitable activity 
because of the return it generates in charges on 
consumers, this may well distort the capital investment 
programme itself. For one thing, utilities may pay 
insufficient attention as to whether a given capital project is 
justified in terms of its physical return to the utility: so the 
utility may over-invest in intrinsically poor projects. 
Moreover, as can be seen from table 1, the financial 
surplus on a project increases with increasing length of 
asset life: this may encourage utilities to invest in long term 
projects disproportionately, at the expense of short term 
projects. In the extreme, this may help to explain the water 
companies’ traditional relative unconcern about detecting 
and repairing leaks, since in the water industry 
infrastructure renewal projects are funded straight from 
revenue, and therefore generate no RCV surplus. In fact, if 
reducing leaks saved enough water to reduce the 
requirement for long term capital investment, this would be 
financially disadvantageous to the utility. 
 
Of course, utilities do not take investment decisions in 
isolation: instead, they are operating in an environment 
where they have to achieve the efficiencies which will 
5.4   Is there any evidence of an excessive return being 
taken on equity? At this point, the discussion in para 4.10 
above becomes relevant. A much better indicator of the 
true return on equity is to relate dividends to the actual 
amount of capital which has been raised by the company 
by means of equity, rather than to the quantity (RCV-debt), 
(since, as has been noted in para 4.10, this latter quantity 
also includes components relating to capital financed from 
revenue, and the effect of inflation on RCV.) It is revealing 
to perform the relevant calculation for the water and 
sewerage companies in England, over the period since the 
mid 1990’s, when the RCV method was introduced. As 
OFWAT has confirmed, the amount of capital raised 
through equity is given as the sum of the terms “called up 
share capital” and “share premium”, in table 7 of  (OFWAT, 
2005), and corresponding tables in earlier volumes. Table 
3 shows dividends expressed as a percentage of this 
amount: 
 
Table 3: Water and sewerage companies in England and 
Wales: dividends as percentage of called up share capital 
plus share premium 
enable them to meet any output targets set by the 
regulators: and regulators will also typically have the right 
to limit the amount of investment that is added to the RCV 
base. So the actual outturn on investment decisions will 
reflect a complex interplay between the perverse incentives 
inherent in current cost RCV charging, with the pressures 
exerted by the regulator. 
 
5.3   Danger of a disproportionate return on equity 
As has been noted above, most of the financial surplus on 
investment is concealed, and will not show up directly as 
profit when the accounts of the utility are expressed in 
 
1996/97 
1997/98 
1998/99 
1999/2000 
2000/01 
2001/02 
2002/03 
2003/04 
2004/05 
 
22.2 
34.5 
32.4 
18.6 
19.3 
13.9 
23.5 
18.4 
18.6 
current cost terms. It is not immediately clear, therefore, 
how this surplus can be easily removed in the shape of 
dividends for equity holders, without the utility showing an 
apparent current cost loss. However, in the case of the 
water industry in England, another element in the 
regulatory accounts becomes relevant at this point. This is 
the so-called “financing adjustment”, which represents a 
notional income element in the regulatory current cost profit 
and loss account, representing the benefit received through 
the eroding effect of inflation on cash debt. It turns out that, 
if the debt of the company is approximately equal to the 
level of debt implied by the historic cost model, then the 
financing adjustment will typically be of the same order of 
magnitude as the concealed financial surplus accruing 
under the current cost RCV method: (the approximation is 
very good for asset lives of around 10 to 15 years: for 
longer asset lives, the surplus will be greater than the 
financing adjustment.) Because of the existence of the 
financing adjustment, the effect is that equity holders can 
remove a large part of the financial surplus generated by 
the RCV method from the company, without pushing 
current cost retained profits in the regulatory accounts into 
the negative. 
 
The figures are striking, and suggest that the return to the 
equity capital actually raised by the water and sewerage 
companies is indeed grossly excessive: (remembering that 
the utilities involved, which are, after all, local monopoly 
suppliers of an essential commodity, will therefore be 
protected from many substantial risks). 
 
5.5   Excessive customer charges 
Since the financial surplus generated by the current cost 
RCV approach arises directly from charges on customers, 
it follows that customers will be being overcharged. 
Overcharging, however, will not just arise as a direct effect. 
As has been argued above, the current cost RCV approach 
will result in significant sub-optimalities in investment 
decisions: the resulting inefficiencies  will, in due course, 
lead to cost increases which will also be passed on to 
customers, leading to additional, indirect, increases in 
customer charges. 
 
5.6   Distortion of gearing ratios 
Since capital investment financed by fixed interest debt 
yields a substantial concealed financial surplus, the effect 
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is likely to be that utilities increase their gearing ratios to 
benefit from this. This could account for the observed 
increase in gearing for, for example, the water and sewage 
companies in England. Given the size of the concealed 
financial surplus, the normal risks associated with high 
gearing will be more apparent than real, since the financial 
surplus is available as a buffer should the utility experience 
a downturn. Given this, owners of companies will have little 
incentive to inject equity capital, which would merely dilute 
the return on existing equity. 
 
6.  The mistakes and fallacies in the current cost 
RCV approach 
6.1   The analysis in this paper leads us to the following 
conundrum. How could the current cost RCV approach, 
which is based on the reasonable sounding principles set 
out in section 3, (namely, ensuring capital maintenance, 
making sure that capital generates a return equal to its 
opportunity cost, securing the benefits of competition, and 
enabling the industry to attract funds for new investment), 
nevertheless lead to the consequences identified in 
sections 4 and 5 above? This section looks again at these 
principles, and identifies where, and how, things have gone 
wrong. 
 
6.2   Capital maintenance 
There are two fundamental flaws in the application of the 
capital maintenance criteria, set out in paragraph 3.3a: 
 
a.   First, the current cost RCV method overestimates the 
cash requirement for running a utility company on a 
sustainable basis. This is demonstrated by the modelling in 
section 4, which shows that the cash required to keep the 
utility running on an ongoing basis, including fully providing 
the required stock of physical capital, is significantly less 
than the cash revenues generated by RCV charging. But 
how has this happened? To answer this, we need to go 
back to the original Treasury Byatt report on which the 
RCV is based. What appears to have gone wrong is that 
the Byatt report has been too simplistic in its analysis of the 
interaction between inflation effects and time effects: Byatt 
neglected the fact that, if a service is provided by means of 
long lived capital assets in an inflationary environment, 
then there is a real cash benefit since the average asset 
base which provides the service will always be several 
years old, and hence has been provided at the reduced 
costs of several years ago: instead, Byatt calculates 
depreciation and interest at today’s prices. 
 
b.   Second, as regards financial (as opposed to physical) 
capital maintenance, the current cost RCV approach fails 
to distinguish precisely what components of financial 
capital need to be maintained. As noted in paragraph 4.10 
above, there are conceptually four different components to 
the funding of RCV: namely, debt, equity, retained profits, 
and inflation, (that is, the time lag effect noted at (a)). As 
well as earning the required interest to service its debt, the 
reasonable requirement would be to preserve the value of 
the equity funded component of RCV, as narrowly defined. 
This would require that the equity component of RCV earns 
a market interest rate of return. But what the RCV method 
actually does is ensure not just that the equity component 
earns a market interest based rate of return, but in addition 
so do the retained profit, and inflation components of RCV - 
all of which are available to reward the shareholders. Far 
from just preserving the value of the equity finance which 
has gone into the company, the current cost RCV method 
implies a gross over-enhancement of the market value of a 
company’s equity, relative to the (inflation preserved) value 
of the equity finance actually raised by the company. 
 
6.3   The opportunity cost of capital 
There are, again, fundamental flaws in the opportunity cost 
argument that earning a market interest rate of return on 
RCV ensures the efficient utilisation of capital resources: 
 
a.   By efficient utilisation of capital resources, what is 
meant is that capital should be deployed on projects which 
yield an optimal real physical benefit to the company or the 
community. But what we are talking about under the 
current cost RCV method is a monetary rate of return 
charged on the value of the capital involved: so the 
economic efficiency argument will only work if there is 
some identity between the real physical return on an 
investment, and the monetary capital charge. 
 
That there will be such an identity is a consequence of 
optimisation behaviour - provided that the managers of the 
undertaking are operating under a budgetary constraint: for 
a body operating within a tight fixed budget constraint, (like 
some government departments), or for a price taker firm 
operating in a competitive market, then it will indeed be 
true to say that a manager will only be able to justify the 
charge against profits represented by the monetary capital 
charge if this is compensated for by some real benefit to 
the undertaking. But this link breaks down, and in fact, 
goes into reverse, for a price maker firm, (such as a typical 
utility), which is able to pass the capital charge onto 
consumers in the form of  increased charges - as happens 
under the RCV method of pricing. In these circumstances, 
the capital charge is in danger of becoming the stimulus 
which drives the system - and the real return from the asset 
of becoming secondary. Far from ensuring efficient 
utilisation of capital resources, application of the RCV 
method for a price maker is a recipe for encouraging over- 
investment in schemes which may have limited real utility - 
particularly if such schemes have long asset lives: since, 
as implied by formula 1, the financial surplus yielded by a 
scheme increases with length of asset life. 
 
b.   There is, however, another manifestation of the 
opportunity cost argument, not in terms of the marginal 
capital investment decision as discussed in (a), but in 
terms of the potential decision to realise all the assets of 
the business, and deploy them elsewhere. On this version 
of the opportunity cost argument, unless a utility is seen to 
be generating a return equal to current market interest 
rates on the whole of its RCV, then economic efficiency 
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would be improved by realising the RCV, and redeploying 
the resources elsewhere. This argument is again flawed, 
however, for the following reasons: 
 
i.   Given society’s need for continuing access to utility 
services like water,  wholesale realisation is not an option; 
 
ii.   Practically, fixed assets like dams etc. are unlikely to be 
realisable; 
 
iii.  An important issue of ownership also arises here.  As 
we have seen, funding of RCV should in principle be 
decomposed into four components, namely, debt, equity, 
retained profits, and inflation effects. It could be argued that 
consumers, and society, as generators of the third 
component, are in effect part owners of RCV, and should 
be due a return on any realisation. So neither the decision 
to realise RCV, nor the sole benefits from any resulting 
distribution of assets, should rest solely with the nominal 
owners of equity. (It is of interest that a broadly similar 
point arises in the document (World Bank, 2004), which 
envisages that in certain circumstances where capital 
assets have been funded by the customer, the operator 
would receive no return on that portion of its regulated 
assets.); 
 
iv. Society and consumers have conferred upon the equity 
owner the right to supply the utility service in question. 
Implicit in this contract there is also a duty to supply. The 
equity owner cannot unilaterally abrogate this duty to 
supply - and cannot unilaterally realise the assets involved 
in RCV and redeploy these elsewhere if this would involve 
cessation of supply, or indeed undue risk of cessation of 
supply; 
 
v.   Linked to (iii), if society has chosen, (as it might well 
do), to take part of the return due to it in the form of lower 
prices, hence reducing the apparent rate of return on RCV, 
this should not be taken as evidence of a failure by the 
utility to generate an adequate overall return on the capital 
employed. 
 
6.4   The issue of opportunity costs has, however, further 
and even more fundamental implications for the RCV 
method. We have seen that the standard opportunity cost 
argument does not hold at the level of the utility itself - 
because, as a price maker, the capital charge is simply 
passed on to the consumer. Opportunity cost decisions can 
really only be taken at the level in the system where price 
increases can no longer be passed on: which means, in 
this case, at the level of the consumer. But for the 
consumer to be able to take opportunity cost decisions 
there would have to be significant extra mechanisms in 
place, which do not exist in a conventional utility. 
 
Consumers would presumably have to operate collectively 
in any such decision: so democratic mechanisms would 
have to be put in place to enable consumers to express a 
collective will. Consumers would then have to be much 
better informed about the nature of the issues facing them: 
and they would need to be provided with realistic options 
among which they could actually choose. One way of 
achieving this latter point would be for consumers to be 
able to exercise decisions over the rewards which, as we 
have argued in the previous paragraph, they should be 
entitled in relation to “their share” of RCV. So consumers 
might, for example, decide collectively to take their share of 
the return due to them in terms of low charges now - or 
might decide to forego lower charges now for the sake of 
increased capital investment, and hence an enhanced 
service, or to subsidise charges to industry for the sake of 
increased economic development. 
 
Overall, the implication, and it is an important implication, is 
that opportunity cost is going to be an effective mechanism 
under RCV only if there are fundamental extensions to the 
extent to which consumers and society as a whole are 
democratically involved in decision taking. 
 
6.5   Competition 
The argument is that the current cost RCV approach 
secures the benefits of potential competition, since it 
ensures that prices are set at a level which provides no 
barrier to potential entrants. Again, there are a number of 
basic fallacies with this argument: 
 
a.   First of all, for most network utilities, free entry, in the 
sense of the potential to set up a competing network, is in 
any event, largely a myth. For most utilities, the best sites, 
(of dams, of tracks, for pipelines, for pylons etc.) will 
already have been secured, leaving a potential competitor 
faced with sub-optimal choices, and horrendous costs 
associated with planning and so on. So the potential for 
genuine new entrants is de facto very small in most cases, 
and arguably, given that there is a natural monopoly, a 
single network is likely to be the most economically efficient 
approach: setting prices high enough to make new entry 
possible is then a nonsense; 
 
b.   That leaves the potential for new entry in the sense of a 
bidder coming in to take over the existing utility. In this 
case, the RCV strategy of setting prices high will be 
reflected in high returns, and a high market valuation of the 
asset. This could indeed attract entrants, as has indeed 
been the case with the water companies in England: but 
arguably, such entrants might be more concerned with the 
financial rewards available through the mechanisms of the 
current cost RCV method, rather than with securing the 
improved efficiency and service to customers which would 
be the normal benefit of competition; 
 
c.   Note also the perverse effect of the strategy of setting 
prices high to attract new entrants. This is precisely counter 
to the normal benefit of competition which is low prices. 
What the high RCV prices do is to enable the equity owner 
to take a return, by way of dividend, which should in part 
accrue to the consumer, due to their contribution to the 
funding of RCV through retained profits. 
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6.6   It is worth noting here that other approaches are 
possible, which might do much more to stimulate 
competition. For example, it would greatly increase the 
potential for new entry if it was clear that what was for sale 
was not the whole RCV of the utility at an inflated price: but 
only that portion of the RCV which had been funded from 
equity, together with the temporary right to manage the 
utility as a whole. This would mean that entry was cheaper 
for potential competitors: and that society (and consumers), 
would be in a much stronger position to strike a deal which 
secured for themselves the benefits to which they were 
due. These benefits due to society and consumers would 
include some economic rent, arising from: 
 
• the consumers’ share of RCV as funded by 
retained profits; 
 
• the value which society is giving to a new entrant 
by bestowing upon them a “right to supply”, and 
the right to earn a normal profit from managing the 
utility as a whole; 
 
• arguably, in the case of national resources like 
water, the rent due to society through their 
inalienable rights in the water resources of the 
country. 
 
6.7   The ability to attract investment funds 
In fact, as has been seen from the model in section 4, the 
current cost RCV method sets charges at a level well 
above what is required to satisfy the Net Present Value 
criterion for investment, which is the base level that would 
be required to attract new investment funds. All that is 
needed to satisfy the Net Present Value criterion is to 
charge historic cost depreciation, and to earn a market rate 
of return on the components of RCV funded by debt, and 
funded from equity. There is no need to earn a return on 
the retained profits and inflation components of RCV. 
 
6.8   What we have seen in this section, therefore, is how 
each of the current cost RCV principles outlined in section 
3 contains basic fallacies. In fact, most of these fallacies 
boil down to one or other of three failures: 
 
a)   the failure to identify the real cost savings arising from 
the interaction of long asset lives with the operation of 
inflation; 
 
b)   the failure to grasp that the standard opportunity cost 
argument does not hold, (and, indeed, that it is perverse), 
in relation to the rate of return on capital, when the industry 
is a price maker rather than a price taker: and that for a 
price maker, the opportunity cost argument will only work if 
there are radical extensions to consumer democracy; 
 
c)   failure to distinguish carefully enough the different 
funding sources of RCV, estimated at current cost, with the 
result that the equity holder of the company is over 
rewarded. 
6.9   Of the failings identified in the previous paragraph, the 
first two are largely inherent in the Byatt report itself. The 
Byatt report also failed to distinguish adequately the 
potential range of funding sources of RCV: but this did not 
matter greatly, since the report was dealing with 
nationalised industries. As the Byatt report said, “Having 
attributed a share of the total real returns to taxation and 
loans, those with an “equity” interest- in this case the nation 
in general- receive the balance.” Source: Byatt Report, 
Vol 1, para, 125. The fundamental failure at c) in the 
previous paragraph occurred at the stage of translating the 
principles of the Byatt report to the private sector: at this 
point, a much more developed understanding of the 
funding sources of RCV was required, but was not 
forthcoming. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
7.1   In this paper we have demonstrated that there are two 
fundamental flaws in the current cost RCV method of utility 
pricing. First, the application of the RCV method turns 
capital investment itself into a highly profitable activity for a 
utility, such that it leads to a cash surplus for the utility 
which could commonly amount to 30% or even much more 
of the value of the investment, post tax. The overall effects 
include substantial overcharging, the potential distortion of 
capital investment programmes, excess profits for equity 
holders, and high gearing ratios for companies. These 
effects have been demonstrated through a simple model of 
utility operation, and also accord with observed utility 
behaviour in the real world. 
 
Second, there is a failure under the RCV approach to 
realise that the standard arguments of opportunity cost do 
not apply to a company which is a price maker, like a 
typical utility. Imposing a capital charge on a price maker 
will simply result in this charge being passed on to the 
consumer: if effective opportunity cost decisions are to be 
taken, these have to be taken at the level where the charge 
finally sticks- namely at the level of the consumer. This has 
fundamental implications for the need to extend democratic 
decision taking by consumers and society. As currently 
practised, the RCV method disenfranchises society and 
consumers. 
 
7.2   These failings stem from basic mistakes and fallacies 
in the fundamental principles on which the current cost 
RCV approach is based. These relate in part to 
weaknesses in the original Byatt report, and in part to 
errors in translating the principles of the Byatt report to the 
different context of price setting for a privatised utility. 
 
7.3   Given our findings, there is an urgent need: 
 
a)   to revisit the principles of current cost accounting set 
out in the Byatt report; 
 
b)   to reconsider the current cost RCV approach to utility 
price setting; 
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c)   to extend democratic decision making so that 
consumers and society can make realistic opportunity cost 
decisions. 
 
7.4   Once there is general agreement on how RCV at 
current cost should be decomposed into its different 
funding sources, this opens up the potential for a radical 
rethink of the whole concept of the ownership of a utility, 
and what utility privatisation actually means. There would 
be many advantages for a model in which a potential 
private sector entrant bid, not for the whole RCV of a 
company at inflated prices, but only for: 
 
i) that part of RCV funded from equity; 
ii) the right to manage the utility for an agreed period. 
 
This would open up the option for much cheaper entry, and 
therefore for truly effective competition. It would also open 
up a natural route by which society could negotiate lower 
charges, reflecting the economic rent due to society 
arising from the factors identified at para 6.6 above. 
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Interest in year t in cash terms will be the sum of 
components from the current and preceding n years, as 
follows:- 
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Historic cost interest in year t = 
n-1 
(1 + r) t-1-k (n - k)i
 
=  (1 + r)
(t -1)
 . (iii) 
∑ 
k=0 
 
Also, for t  ≥  n , 
n   
k
 
 
i(1 + r) t-1
 
= 
n-1 
RCV in year t = (1 + r) (t -1) ∑ = 
k=1 
n 
∑ (n - k)(1 + r) -k 
n 
k=0 
 
(n + 1)(1 + r) 
2 
 
(t -1) 
, 
 
 
 
i(1 + r) t-n-1
 
 
= 
n-1 
so the RCV capital charge in year t is 
i(n + 1)(1 + r) 
(t-1)
 
. (iv) 
∑ (n - k)(1 + r) n-k 2 
n 
k=0 
= 
i(1 + r) t-n-1    
n 
4.   Subtracting expressions (i) and (ii) from the sum of 
expressions (iii) and (iv) then gives the cash excess of RCV 
 
n 
 
 
i(1 + r) t-n
 
∑ k(1 + r) k 
k=1 
= 
n 
revenues in year t over historic cost depreciation and 
interest charges. Formula (1) then follows on deflating this 
cash expression to real terms. Since we assume that 
interest and depreciation payments are made at end year, 
t
 
∑ k(1 + r) k-1 
n 
k=1 
 
which, using the above, = 
we have used a deflation factor for year t of (1 + r) , 
reflecting end year prices. 
 
Formula (2), for the gearing ratio, follows immediately on 
dividing the expression for historic cost debt at the end of 
i(1 + r) 
t-n
 
n 
(n + 1)(1 + r) 
n 
[ 
r 
((1 + r) 
n+1 
- 1) 
- 
r 
2 ] 
= 
para 2 above by the expression in para 3 above for RCV. 
i(1 + r) 
t 
[1 + 
r 
 
i(1 + r) 
t 
1 (1 + r) 
- 
n nr 
= 
1 
(1 + r) 
-n 
+ ] 
nr 
 
r 
(ii) 
[1 - (1 - (1 + r) 
-n 
)] . 
nr 
The corresponding expressions for debt under the historic 
cost model follow immediately on omitting the term i in the 
above. 
 
RCV 
3.   In this paper, we have slightly simplified the RCV 
method as it is normally applied in practice, in that we 
assume RCV is calculated at the start of the year in 
question, rather than at the mid-year average. 
For t ≥  n , depreciation at current cost in year t will 
1 
consist of n tranches, each consisting of 
n 
asset valued at current prices: that is, at the 
prices at the beginning of year t: hence, 
of a capital
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